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Foreword
Alain C. Enthoven’s paper, To Reform Medicare, 
Reform Incentives And Organization, explains how the 
principles of cost-responsible consumer choice among 
competing health-insurance plans, sometimes called 
“managed competition,” can both improve quality 
and reduce cost in the federal government’s Medicare 
program.
Medicare is both the essential “insurer of insurance” 
for the U.S. elderly population, and by far the most 
important cause of the long-term crisis in the federal 
budget.  Its role as a cost driver in the budget is indi-
rectly linked to rising cost throughout the U.S. health-
care industry.  While its essential function of providing 
coverage to senior citizens must be fulfilled, its cost 
growth must be slowed – or else the federal govern-
ment will be forced to make very painful choices, 
among which will be reneging on that commitment to 
our seniors.  And ideally, the steps to control its cost 
growth should contribute to both cost savings and 
improvements in quality throughout the healthcare 
system.
Professor Enthoven, who was a pioneer of the concept 
of managed competition, shows how that concept 
can be applied to Medicare – which today, though 
heavily managed in many respects, is largely devoid of 
competition.  The objective is to give insurance plans, 
healthcare providers and the elderly reasons to seek 
high quality, efficient health care – which they do not 
have under today’s largely fee-for-service system.  The 
result should be providers and insurers who see that 
they can prosper if they deliver quality health care to 
consumers at attractive prices.  Those providers and 
insurers then will seek every possible way to reduce 
costs while maintaining and even improving quality – 
which they have  reason to do now.little
The analysis in and findings of this paper are fully 
consistent with the CED policy statement, Quality, 
Affordable Health Care for All: Moving Beyond the 
Employer-Based Health-Insurance System, published in 
October of 2007, and for which Professor Enthoven 
was the project director.  CED is pleased to endorse 
this paper and to make it available to policymakers and 
the public.
Patrick W. Gross
William W. Lewis
Co-Chairs
Policy & Impact Committee
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Medicare expenditures, about $556 billion in 2011, 
have been growing more than three percentage 
points per year faster than the GDP over the past 
25 years.  In the next 10 years, with the retirement of 
the baby-boomers, the growth rate of the beneficiary 
population will increase from 2 to 3 percent per year.  
Under present policies, annual Medicare expenditures 
are likely to reach $1 trillion. Growth in Medicare 
outlays must be brought into line with growth of GDP.
Medicare spending has grown faster than GDP be-
cause of aging of the population; a large increase in the 
prevalence of costly chronic conditions and in the costs 
of treating them (which requires a healthcare system 
that is oriented to prevention and care of chronic con-
ditions instead of today’s acute-care-oriented system); 
advancing technology, which expands what medical 
care can do to improve and lengthen lives; and our 
fragmented financing and delivery system that is filled 
with cost-increasing incentives and cost-unconscious 
demand. American medicine is dominated by unco-
ordinated open-ended fee-for-service (FFS) which 
encourages providers to deliver greater volumes of care, 
not necessarily improved outcomes.
In 2005, a Committee of the National Academy of 
Sciences reported “an estimated thirty to forty cents 
of every dollar spent on health care…is spent on costs 
associated with overuse, underuse, misuse, duplication, 
system failures, unnecessary repetition, poor com-
munication and inefficiency.” Curing these problems 
will require a profound change in organization and 
incentives.
Integrated delivery systems (IDS) can cure frag-
mentation and perverse incentives.  An effective 
IDS management structure gives all participants 
information, incentives and resources – all components 
necessary for high-quality comprehensive care – to 
work together to do what is best for patients. There are 
many ways to cut costs while improving quality, includ-
ing but not limited to: best practices for prevention of 
infections; stronger primary care for prevention, early 
detection and treatment of disease; provider incen-
tives aligned with needs of members for high-quality, 
affordable care; and active management of chronic 
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diseases to reduce need for hospital care. Potential cost 
savings depend on circumstances, but generally are on 
the order of 20 to 30 percent for premium and out–of-
pocket costs.
The best and probably only way to move from today’s 
fragmented system to IDS is through informed cost-
conscious consumer choice -- under which people 
decide for themselves and keep the savings if they 
choose wisely.  This would require insurance exchang-
es, that is, organized markets where consumers choose 
plans with rules to promote efficiency and equity.
The “managed competition” idea (sometimes called 
“premium support” in the Medicare context) is based 
on the successful experience of some employment 
groups that offer an annual choice among plans based 
on IDS and others based on FFS. The employer offers 
a defined contribution, often set at or below the price 
of the lowest-priced alternative, so that the employees 
choosing the least-costly plan save money, but others 
who want more costly plans must pay the full premium 
difference out of pocket. Experience in large employ-
ment groups that offer such choices is that most 
people choose IDS.  Competition among integrated 
plans ensures cost control and consumer satisfaction. 
“Managed competition” is not a “free market” without 
rules. It is not a “voucher” plan in which people are left 
to fend for themselves.   Rules  include a guaranteed 
right to enroll in the plan of the consumer’s choice; the 
same price for same coverage without discrimination 
against the sick; risk-adjusted payments by government 
or employer so that plans are not penalized for enroll-
ing sick people; and one or a few standard coverage 
contracts to make comparisons easy.
Versions of managed competition for Medicare 
reform have been proposed by, among others, the 
Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare 
(“Breaux-Thomas”) in 1999, and more recently by the 
Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force 
(“Domenici-Rivlin”), and by Congressman Paul Ryan.  
The idea could lead to bipartisan agreement.
What are the alternatives to managed competition?   
First, in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the context 
of FFS Medicare, the Congress created “Accountable 
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Care Organizations”, a new form of IDS.  They are 
voluntary arrangements, and the incentives for provid-
ers to leave FFS and form ACOs and cut costs are 
weak. Ninety-three percent of the members of the 
American Medical Group Association said they would 
not participate under the proposed rules.  Second, 
within the ACA framework, Congress may expect 
to rely on cutting provider payments.  This approach 
has all the problems of price controls.  Doctors may 
refuse to accept new Medicare patients. Third, the 
ACA includes a board of 15 appointed experts, the 
“Independent Payment Advisory Board” (IPAB), 
serving full time with the government with no conflicts 
of interest. The IPAB is charged with inventing and 
recommending cost-cutting ideas, which go into effect 
unless the Congress substitutes equally effective 
measures or overrides them with a super-majority. 
Most of the waste described in the National Academy 
of Sciences report is local in nature, as are the po-
tential cures through process improvement, but the 
Washington-based IPAB is unlikely to focus effectively 
on local issues.
What else must be done?  Employment-based 
insurance provides a market full of cost-unconscious 
demand that will undermine Medicare reform by 
competing with Medicare for resources. (See the 2007 
CED report.)  To stop the open-ended tax subsidy to 
more-costly health insurance, the exclusion of employ-
er contributions from the taxable incomes of employees 
should be abolished and replaced by a refundable tax 
credit usable only for purchase of health insurance, 
independent of the employer. The range of choices 
available to employees should be broadened by phasing 
in a requirement that small employers with under 
500 employees (about half the work force) buy health 
insurance through the exchanges, while continuing to 
contribute a substantial part of the costs themselves.  
Also, an effective anti-trust policy for health care is 
essential for true savings from competition.
Conclusion.  The savings from a system made up of 
mostly competing IDS or ACOs, each financed by 
risk-adjusted global per-capita payment, marketed 
through exchanges, could be very large. Of the 30 to 
40 percent waste described in the National Academies’ 
report, waste reduction equal to 30 percent of total 
spending might be a feasible target over a decade or 
two. Eventually, these fundamental changes could yield 
improved quality of care and healthcare expenditures 
half of what they would be if we stayed with the failed 
model we have today. 
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The United States faces an enormous economic chal-
lenge:  Our stumbling economy is beset by a large and 
rapidly growing burden of public debt.  The newly cre-
ated Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction has 
a priceless opportunity to meet this challenge.  Success 
would lift American spirits far beyond the confines 
of the financial system and the economy.  But the 
Committee must not squander this opportunity.  The 
global economic and financial environment is fraught.  
Failure by the Committee would send a chilling signal 
to the entire world economy.  The members of the Joint 
Select Committee must reject their partisan urges to 
engineer failure as a political weapon to be used in the 
next election.
But with all of the will in the world, the task of the 
Joint Select Committee is perhaps the most complex in 
modern economic history.  Strengthening the danger-
ously weak economy now would seem contrary to the 
need to reduce the current oversized federal budget 
deficits, and thereby slow the excessive accumulation 
of debt.  Squaring this circle will require a deft deficit-
reduction policy that builds business confidence today 
by providing demonstrated long-run relief from the 
pressures on the budget.
Before the business community will make investment 
decisions and put more Americans back to work, there 
must be predictability in the economy, a sustainable 
fiscal outlook, and some assurance that the tax burden 
will not grow out of control.  And to expand in the 
United States rather than overseas, business decision 
makers also need a productive and educated work force 
able to learn and perform new tasks effectively.
Present trends are not positive in these respects.  Our 
unsustainable situation leaves too many “unknown 
unknowns.”
Perhaps dominating this environment, health care 
spending in the United States has grown much faster 
than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for many 
years.  And because the government’s health care 
programs also have been growing faster than the GDP, 
they strain public finances at every level of government. 
They crowd out other important public programs, such 
as infrastructure and education, which are necessary 
for economic growth.
Medicare expenditures have been growing more than 
three percentage points per year faster than the GDP 
over the past 25 years. In the next 10 years, with the 
retirement of the baby-boom generation, the growth 
rate of the beneficiary population will increase from 2 
percent to 3 percent per year.  Already, in 2010, health 
care (including the tax exclusion of employer contribu-
tions to employee health insurance) drained the federal 
budget by about $1.2 trillion.  And under present 
policies, the annual expenditures of Medicare alone are 
likely to come close to $1 trillion in ten years – more 
than 80 percent greater than they are today.
Growth in government outlays for these healthcare 
programs must be brought into line with growth in the 
GDP because, with stable tax rates, tax revenues grow 
approximately with the GDP, and not much faster.  In 
fact, if current projections hold true – and there is no 
reason to expect natural causes to correct our course – 
no other remotely feasible policy change will solve our 
budget problem.  If the prodigious growth of health 
costs cannot be curbed, it will explode not only federal 
finances, but also business budgets as well.  Employers 
have struggled with health-cost inflation on a day-to-
day basis, and see this threat to our prosperity with 
painful clarity.
Causes Of Excess Spending Growth
Healthcare costs have outstripped the nation’s income 
for many and complex reasons.  Here are some of the 
most important.
First, the overall growth in age of the population adds 
a modest amount to per capita expenditure, about 
0.5 percent per year in total.  But aging is a particular 
concern for government costs, because the retirement 
of the baby boomers will increase the Medicare-eligible 
population rapidly, from 47.1 million in 2010 to 63.5 
million in 2020, and the even-more-rapidly growing 
population of the very old will add to public costs for 
long-term care.
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Second, there has been a large increase in the preva-
lence of costly chronic conditions and in the costs of 
treating them.  Kenneth Thorpe reported that from 
1987 to 2002, for example, the prevalence of diabetes 
in the Medicare population increased by one third, and 
the cost per case increased by about one fourth.1  The 
healthcare financing and delivery system cannot solve 
this problem on its own.  A large change in American 
culture and lifestyle is needed.  But, as a part of the 
overall solution, we do need a health care system that is 
fundamentally oriented to disease prevention and care 
of costly chronic conditions.  Today’s system is oriented 
instead to acute care, and programs like Medicare 
do a poor job of managing chronic conditions before 
they become acute.  Medicare pays a great deal for the 
amputation of the leg of a diabetic patient, but noth-
ing for nurses whose care could have headed off that 
dreadful condition.
Third, advancing technology expands what medi-
cal care can do to improve and lengthen the lives of 
patients.  Much of this is valuable and worth the cost.  
But much new technology is not well evaluated before 
it is deployed.  Some is found actually to be harmful 
(e.g. VIOXX, and all-metal joint implants).  And many 
highly touted innovations do not necessarily improve 
outcomes.  Typically, clinical trials of new drugs com-
pare them for safety and efficacy to a placebo, not the 
best existing generic drug.  Other innovations are very 
costly for the little medical benefit they confer, or are 
used in cases where the benefit is small or non-existent. 
Recognizing this, the Congress in the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) established a Patient-Centered Outcomes 
and Research Trust Fund to finance comparative 
effectiveness research.  Such research is important and 
deserves strong continuing financial support, despite 
the opposition of drug and medical device companies.
Of course, comparative effectiveness information alone 
will not avoid waste.  We need a healthcare financing 
and delivery system that motivates decision-makers 
to avoid wasteful spending, and to demand value for 
money in their purchasing decisions.
And the fourth major cause of health-cost inflation 
is our fragmented financing and delivery system 
that is filled with cost-increasing incentives and cost-
unconscious demand.  With consequences that are 
becoming increasingly apparent, American medicine 
is dominated by our uncoordinated open-ended 
fee-for-service (FFS) system, which encourages provid-
ers to deliver greater volumes of care, not improved 
outcomes, and in which insured patients have little 
information and no financial incentive to avoid costly 
but worthless care.  (Open-ended means no budget.  
The decision-makers perceive no limit on resources 
they can spend in making treatment decisions.)  Open-
ended FFS exacerbates the problem of futile spending 
on end-of-life care.  Open-ended fee-for-service and the 
traditional medical culture of autonomy work against 
the kind of teamwork (sharing of information and best 
practices) needed to improve the quality and economy 
of care.
In 2009, the Massachusetts Special Commission on 
the Health Care Payment System said, “FFS rewards 
over use of services, does not encourage consideration 
of resource use, and thus cannot build in limitations 
on cost growth.”  The Commission concluded that 
“risk-adjusted prospective payment models that provide 
appropriate incentives for efficiency…should serve as 
the direction for payment reform…”2 (“Risk-adjusted” 
means that the payments to insurers are adjusted 
to take account of the health status of the enrolled 
patients. Such methods exist and are in practical 
application today.) 
In a 2005 report, a committee of the Institute of 
Medicine and the National Academy of Engineering 
reported “an estimated thirty to forty cents of every 
dollar spent on health care, or more than a half-trillion 
dollars per year, is spent on costs associated with 
overuse, underuse, misuse, duplication, system failures, 
unnecessary repetition, poor communication, and 
inefficiency.”3  As the Government Accountability 
Office has recently reported, Medicare and Medicaid 
are particularly vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse and 
improper payments.4  
1 Kenneth E. Thorpe and David H. Howard, “The Rise in Spending Among Medicare Beneficiaries: The Role of Chronic Disease Prevalence And 
Changes in Treatment Intensity,” Health Affairs, Web Exclusive 26 August 2006, w378-88. 
2 Recommendations of the Special Commission on the Health Care Payment System, State of Massachusetts, July 16, 2009 
3 National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies of Science, Building a Better Delivery System: A New 
Engineering/Health Care Partnership, Washington DC, July 20, 2005 
4 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Improper Payments: Reported Medicare Estimates and Key Remediation Strategies,” GAO-11-842T, 
July 28, 2011.  
6 To Reform Medicare, Reform Incentives and Organization
Curing these problems will require a profound change 
in organization and incentives.  As the Massachusetts 
Special Commission concluded, we need to move from 
today’s system dominated by solo or small single-
specialty group practice to one made up of organized, 
integrated financing and delivery systems paid for by 
risk-adjusted per-capita payments set in advance.  And 
we need a fundamental change from cost-unconscious-
ness and the expenditure-increasing incentives of FFS 
to a model that rewards both consumers and providers 
for making wise use of resources.
Medicare Is Fragmented In Many Ways
Fragmentation of decision-making in Medicare costs 
money and reduces the quality of care at the same 
time.
Most of the physicians who care for Medicare patients 
have no steady continuing relationship with Medicare.  
Medicare is just one payer among many.  This affects 
those physicians’ behavior for the worse.
And for most beneficiaries, Medicare is actually four 
separate insurance plans, not one.  (The 25 percent 
of beneficiaries who join Medicare Advantage do get 
a single integrated health plan.)  They are Medicare 
Part A, an insurance plan for inpatient hospital care; 
Medicare Part B for physician services and outpatient 
hospital care; Medicare Part D for prescription 
drugs; and either Medicare supplemental insurance 
(“Medi-Gap”) from private companies, or the public 
federal-state Medicaid program for the poor aged and 
disabled.  Besides adding to complexity for patients 
and providers, these different insurance plans in their 
different “silos” lack a coordinating mechanism to 
harmonize decisions, improve outcomes and reduce 
costs.
The Medicare and Medicaid programs fight over which 
plan must pay for some services to people covered by 
both.  Physicians paid under Part B have no economic 
stake in the costs or effectiveness of drugs paid for in 
Part D.  Some drugs may cost more than others and 
be more or less effective in reducing patients’ needs 
for hospital or more doctor visits.  Drugs should be 
chosen with the total health benefit and system cost 
in mind, but there is nothing in traditional Medicare 
to encourage or facilitate that.  Medicare Parts A and 
B include deductibles and coinsurance to give benefi-
ciaries incentives to use resources wisely, but Medicare 
supplemental insurance covers the deductibles and 
coinsurance, defeating this design objective of Parts A 
and B.
The hospitals and the doctors serving Medicare often 
have conflicting incentives.  Doctors can demand that 
hospitals deploy very costly technologies at the hos-
pital’s expense, which may facilitate doctors charging 
higher fees for more complex services – even though 
such services have little or no benefit to the patient.
What Can Be Done?  Integrated Delivery 
Systems Cure Fragmentation And Perverse 
Incentives
People want to choose their own health care, and 
they deserve that right.  However, healthcare costs 
will continue spiraling out of control unless efficiency 
improves dramatically.  By all indications, the current 
state of the art in healthcare delivery could achieve that 
improvement – if only it were more widely applied.
In “Integrated Delivery Systems” (IDS), an effective 
management structure gives all participants informa-
tion, incentives and resources to work together to 
do what is best for patients.  Medicare beneficiaries 
would be better off if, just as many did in their pre-
Medicare working years, they could choose among 
comprehensive health plans whose management sought 
to give them good experiences and outcomes.  The best 
systems align incentives so that doctors are rewarded 
for high-quality, efficient care that satisfies patients, 
and for teamwork.  Their hospitals work with doctors 
to deliver affordable service, including programs that 
reduce patients’ needs for hospital inpatient care.5
5 Some healthcare analysts have favored Consumer Directed Health Plans (CDHPs), involving high-deductible insurance with tax-favored 
Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) to cover partially the non-covered expenses.  This approach has significant weaknesses, especially in the context 
of Medicare.  Most healthcare expenses arise from the small proportion of beneficiaries who have the most costly illnesses.  Those expenses rise far 
beyond any conceivable deductible amount, and so would not be affected by any incentives that would tend to reduce consumer expenditure.  And 
that is especially true for the elderly, who would be the least able and likely to shop for lower-cost providers and treatments for serious illnesses.  Cost-
conscious choice among health plans, during an annual open-season period rather than under the time pressure associated with a serious medical 
condition, holds a far better prospect of reducing cost growth without reducing the quality of care.
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The term “integrated” means that all components 
necessary for high-quality comprehensive care work 
together.  Usually, such systems emphasize primary 
care – relying on the primary-care physician, aided 
by a comprehensive health record, to coordinate care, 
resolve conflicts between specialists, and fill gaps 
left by them.  The primary care physician acts as the 
“prime contractor” who sees to it that the patient’s care 
is complete and coordinated.
The exact savings achieved by IDS vary with circum-
stances, but generally are on the order of 20 percent to 
30 percent for premium and out-of-pocket costs.  And 
these savings are achieved by islands of efficiency in 
the midst of the overall U.S. healthcare system that 
is dominated by open-ended fee-for-service medicine, 
driven by cost-unconscious consumers and providers.  
It seems reasonable that the savings would be much 
greater if many more efficient systems competed with 
each other to serve cost-conscious consumers, and if all 
consumers who chose such efficient systems could save 
money by doing so.  Of course, the other side of that 
coin would be that consumers who chose open-ended 
FFS – as should be their right – in effect had to pay 
the extra costs of that option out of their own pockets.  
Such a fundamental shift of incentives would require 
at least a prospective effective date, to give individuals 
time to plan.  Some might argue for grandfathering 
of current beneficiaries, but the merits of that option 
must be weighed against any delay in fundamental 
change of a dysfunctional system.6
Congress pursued such organized systems of care 
through Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).  An ACO is a group of 
physicians and hospitals that accept joint responsibility 
for the quality and cost of comprehensive care provided 
to their beneficiaries.  Unfortunately, the ACA provi-
sions are so limited that they are unlikely to have much 
effect on Medicare costs (see below).
The best and probably only way to move from today’s 
fragmented system to IDS is through informed 
cost-conscious consumer choice – to let people decide 
for themselves and to keep the savings if they choose 
wisely.  This would require insurance exchanges, that 
is, organized markets that manage consumer choices 
with rules to promote equity and efficiency.  The 
exchanges contract with participating health plans or 
ACOs to offer coverage contracts that meet established 
standards, among which all beneficiaries can choose in 
a convenient annual open enrollment process.
Some such exchanges already exist in the private and 
government sectors.  The best examples have web sites 
and call centers staffed by certified benefits counselors 
who assist beneficiaries in their choices.7 They also 
offer software that simplifies choices and helps people 
who prefer that medium to focus on the few alterna-
tives most likely to meet their needs and preferences.  
When consumers choose through exchanges rather 
than dealing with insurers directly, insurers cannot use 
the enrollment process to select risks.  Perhaps even 
more important, this is a far less costly way to dis-
tribute insurance than practices in the private market 
today, with their high costs of designing, underwriting 
and selling non-standard contracts to individuals and 
small groups.  In the exchange model, insurers sell 
standard contracts to hundreds of thousands of people, 
realizing great economies of scale. That plus competi-
tion reduces greatly insurers’ distribution costs.
This “managed competition“ idea (sometimes called 
“premium support” in the Medicare context) is based 
on the successful experience of some employment 
groups that offer an annual choice among plans based 
on IDS and others based on FFS.8  The employer 
offers a fixed-dollar contribution, often set at or below 
the price of the lowest-priced alternative, so that the 
employee choosing the least-costly plan saves money, 
but others who want more-costly plans must pay the 
full premium difference (not the total cost) out of 
pocket.  Employees who are not satisfied with their 
plans may change plans at the next annual open enroll-
ment.  Typically, very high percentages choose the less 
costly plans that involve, to some extent, global pro-
spective payment9 rather than FFS.  At Stanford, the 
University of California and the California system for 
6 Younger, newly eligible Medicare beneficiaries certainly would be the most likely to be acquainted with the notion of choosing among alternative 
healthcare plans.  Many might welcome the opportunity to stay with coverage like what they have now, rather than be forced to transfer into the 
different conventional Medicare system, which might require that they change physicians. 
7 For an example, see Extend Health Insurance Exchange at www.extendhealth.com/about/contact. 
8 Alain C. Enthoven, “The History and Principles of Managed Competition,” Health Affairs, Vol. 12, Supplement 1993. 
9 In California, this is called “per capita prepayment.”
8 To Reform Medicare, Reform Incentives and Organization
state employees, typically some 80 percent of employ-
ees choose the economical plans.  Among Wisconsin 
state employees, the percent is higher.  This should not 
be surprising.  In a voluntary process, people migrate 
to what they see as value for money.
Meanwhile, competition among integrated plans 
ensures cost control and consumer satisfaction.  With 
the anti-managed-care backlash of the 1990s, it 
became conventional wisdom that people would not 
accept any insurance contract that limited their choice 
of doctors.  But research showed that dissatisfaction 
with managed care was concentrated among those who 
were assigned to it by their employers without a choice 
and without being offered the financial savings.10 
Through those years, the percentage of employees who 
chose managed care held up well, and the most satis-
fied consumers were in the plans with the narrowest 
physician networks.  Although it was the forced change 
that, understandably, angered people, the conventional 
wisdom unjustifiably implicating all managed care 
became a force in policy making.
How can a limited choice of provider, rather than 
traditional insurance with a free choice of provider at 
all times, yield both higher-quality and less-costly care? 
The answer is that medical care has become extremely 
complex, far beyond the ability of any individual doctor 
to master, and so the best medicine has become team 
medicine.  To explain this, Laura Tollen and I wrote:
We need systems to ensure that providers are 
carefully selected, trained and proficient in 
the specific diagnosis and treatment needed 
by the patient; deployed in the appropriate 
numbers and specialties to meet a population’s 
needs efficiently; current on evidence-based 
practice and supported by tools to overcome 
widespread practice variations and quality 
failures; supported by a complete up-to-date 
and accurate medical history (preferably 
electronic) of each patient; supported by teams 
of colleagues sharing goals work processes and 
information and able to coordinate care across 
multiple settings; a system that records test 
results, diagnoses and treatments and trans-
mits orders accurately; supported by a system 
of knowledge management so that the massive 
flow of research literature can be translated 
into bedside guidelines for each doctor.
It takes systems to improve quality and econ-
omy:  systems of doctors working together to 
evaluate the outcomes produced by their care 
and to design improved care processes, to select 
doctors for quality, efficiency and teamwork, 
to develop and share best practice guidelines 
and to train their doctors in them, to devise 
payment systems that reward innovation in 
developing better care, to share information on 
care patterns and outcomes in order to be able 
to evaluate what works best and to educate all 
the doctors in best practices.  Doctors in the 
best integrated delivery systems share complete 
information on what they do, which exposes 
doctors to review and evaluation by their peers, 
allowing their peers to approach them with 
advice about how to do better.11
Managed competition is not a “free market” in which 
anyone can sell any kind of health insurance to anyone 
else.  There are many reasons why such a free market 
has not worked.  For one, health insurance is an 
extremely complex business.  Almost no consumer 
really understands or has even read his or her health 
insurance contract.  And if allowed, insurance compa-
nies offer very complex products that only a persistent 
Ph.D. in actuarial science could compare with the 
alternatives – attenuating price competition, and 
deterring people from switching plans to save money.  
Also, complex non-standard insurance contracts 
increase administrative cost, because each provider of 
care must figure out from each patient’s own almost-
unique insurance contract who is supposed to pay 
what.  Insurance companies resist standardization in 
large part because they, like any other business, want 
to avoid price competition.  Managed competition 
would standardize contracts to save money and to 
make it easier for people to make valid side-by-side 
comparisons.
10 Alain Enthoven, Helen Halpin Schauffler, and Sara McMenamin, “Consumer Choice and the Managed Care Backlash,” American Journal of law 
and Medicine, 27(1), 2001, p. 1-15. Atul Gawande, et.al. “Does Dissatisfaction with Health Plans Stem from Having No Choices?”, Health Affairs 17, 
no.5 (1998), pp.184-194. Karen Davis, et.al. “Choice Matters: Enrollees’ Views of their Health Plans,” Health Affairs 14, no.2 (1995) pp.99-112. 
11 Alain Enthoven and Laura Tollen, “Competition in Health Care: It Takes Systems To Pursue Quality and Efficiency,” Health Affairs Web 
Exclusive 7 September 2005, also Volume 24, supplement 3.
To Reform Medicare, Reform Incentives and Organization 9
In a totally free market, insurers can reject applicants, 
and so they can avoid insuring the people who need 
insurance most.  In managed competition, by contract 
with the exchange, every participating insurer must 
accept every applicant, regardless of health status.  
Risk adjustment compensates those insurers who 
enroll sicker people.
Also, in a totally free market, young, healthy people 
can refrain from buying insurance until they get sick.  
And if insurers must sell to anyone who wants it, then 
people will wait to insure until they are sick, driving up 
the cost of insurance.  So an obligation for insurers to 
sell insurance must be balanced by a reciprocal obliga-
tion on consumers to buy, even when they are healthy.  
This can be enforced by the individual mandate in the 
ACA, now the subject of many lawsuits, or by a system 
of taxes and subsidies to induce even the healthy to 
insure.12 In the case of Medicare, this is not an issue as 
long as the premium support payments are reasonably 
close to the low-priced plan in each area.  Medicare 
Part A beneficiaries will have already paid for their 
hospital coverage through a working lifetime of payroll 
taxes.
In sum, the managed competition framework includes, 
for the participating consumers, providers and 
insurers, 
•	 a guaranteed right to enroll in the plan of the 
consumer’s choice;  
•	 the same price to all consumers for the same cover-
age (without discrimination against the sick); 
•	 periodic open enrollment for covered beneficiaries 
managed through an exchange; 
•	 full responsibility on the part of consumers for 
premium differences; 
•	 risk-adjusted payments by government or the em-
ployer so that plans are not penalized for enrolling 
sick people, or alternatively, to make it profitable 
to develop expertise in caring for predictably sick 
people (e.g. diabetics); 
•	 one or a few standard coverage contracts to make 
comparisons easy and to simplify provider billing; 
•	 reliable and unbiased accessible information on 
prices, quality and consumer satisfaction; and
•	 insurance transactions executed through an 
exchange to facilitate consumer choice and achieve 
economies in marketing.13
•	 This clearly is not a proposal for “vouchers,” in 
which a senior would be handed a coupon and told 
to go and see if he or she can find a private insur-
ance company that will offer them coverage.
Managed Competition For Medicare In The 
Political Arena
If it has not already, it must soon dawn on current and 
future beneficiaries – and healthcare providers as well 
– that Medicare as we know it, based on open-ended 
fee for service, is unsustainable.  It must, one way or 
another, be curbed severely.  On the present course, 
that is likely to be done by reductions in provider 
payment rates and imposed price discounts for drugs 
and devices.  Part B premiums will increase.  Medicare 
Advantage payments in excess of fee-for-service costs 
will phase out, and so participation of carriers in the 
program will decline. As this process plays out, grow-
ing numbers of physicians will opt out of Medicare 
participation, and so Medicare will increasingly come 
to resemble Medicaid.  As in Canada, waiting times 
for elective hospital care will grow.  Cost-shifting to 
the private sector will increase.  And, ironically, at the 
same time, the 30 to 40 percent waste identified by the 
National Academy of Sciences will remain untouched; 
there will be no meaningful delivery system reform.
Obviously, this status quo track leads to a dead end.  
What can we do to make Medicare financially sustain-
able, while not diminishing – or even improving – its 
quality of care?  Not surprisingly, there will be resis-
tance to any attempt to slow the growth of healthcare 
spending.  Every dollar of spending is income to some 
provider, and those providers believe in what they 
12 Committee for Economic Development, Quality, Affordable Health Care for All: Moving Beyond the Employer-Based Health-Insurance System, 
Washington DC 2007.  http://ced.issuelab.org/research/listing/quality_affordable_health_care_for_all_moving_beyond_the_employer_based_
health_insurance_system 
13 Alain Enthoven, “Reform Medicare by Reforming Incentives,” The New England Journal of Medicine, 2011; 364e44, May 26, 2011.
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do.  It might be daunting for policymakers to face the 
arguments of trained medical professionals.  But those 
trained medical professionals differ among themselves.  
Practice patterns differ widely from one physician or 
hospital to another, in ways that cannot be explained 
by differences among cases.  So industry objections 
to saving money by treating patients the right way the 
first time should not be allowed to end the debate; and 
resistance from different sectors of the industry should 
be expected, and should be received openly but criti-
cally.  And both policymakers and healthcare providers 
must recognize and accept that the unsustainable 
status quo is by definition not an option.  Once the in-
evitability of change is understood, an efficient and fair 
market system may become the preferred alternative.
Retirees.  Under most market reform proposals, 
people now on traditional Medicare will be able to 
remain so, though possibly at a growing out of pocket 
cost.  Under managed competition, beneficiaries who 
switch to IDS will be able to gain financial savings, 
better-coordinated care, and an easier system to navi-
gate.  Many will be able to remain with the IDS that 
served them in pre-retirement years; the one-fourth 
of beneficiaries who have chosen Medicare Advantage 
plans will be able to remain with them, provided the 
health plans remain in the program.
Physicians.  Traditionally, the medical profession 
has fought hard for open-ended fee for service and for 
professional autonomy.14  They resisted multi-specialty 
group practice and selective provider contracting by 
insurers.  Some physicians, particularly older ones, 
will not support a reform that creates incentives for 
integration of care and physician financial responsibil-
ity for costs.  However, physician dissatisfaction with 
the present state of affairs and trends in payment may 
change these attitudes.
In the absence of fundamental reform, spending will 
be controlled by bureaucrats or insurance companies, 
not physicians.  In contrast, physicians who choose to 
give up individual autonomy by forming groups that 
take responsibility for managing cost and quality will 
be able to regain professional autonomy within their 
self-governing medical groups.  Someone may still 
ask them to change practice patterns, but at least the 
recommendations will be made by similarly situated 
physician partners.
Prepaid group practice offers many advantages for 
physicians, including better professional support 
systems, freedom from non-medical administrative 
chores, controllable hours, and collegiality. Research 
shows that the most professionally satisfied physicians 
in California are in prepaid group practice.  They have 
to deal with only one insurance company, and that 
is their responsible partner that does not attempt to 
interfere with medical decisions.
Hospitals have traditionally favored open-ended fee 
for service and full-cost reimbursement.  They do not 
favor vigorous anti-trust enforcement in the hospital 
industry.  Their main motivation under existing 
payment models has been to keep the beds full.  In an 
IDS, hospitals work with doctors to keep people from 
needing to be hospitalized.  The hospital becomes a 
partner in a system designed to reduce overall cost per 
covered consumer.  Many hospital boards and manag-
ers will recognize that we will always need hospitals 
and that their roles as non-profit community service 
providers would be best served by forming efficient 
delivery systems.
Pharmaceutical companies have traditionally favored 
open-ended fee for service and have resisted the 
formation of systems with cost-conscious purchasers.  
However, they may prefer a managed-competition 
market to the almost inevitable government price 
controls on the European model that would be likely to 
follow a continued explosion of Medicare spending.
Device companies favor the present system in which 
their customers are fragmented between doctors and 
hospitals, and they are free to influence purchases by 
doctors who are not financially responsible for the 
costs.  This will have to change.  Device companies may 
well come to prefer market reform in which purchasers 
pay for value to government-imposed discounted prices 
and Medicare coverage decisions that block implemen-
tation of product innovations.
Health insurance companies developed their business 
models to conform to open-ended fee for service.  But 
some of them have been innovative in introducing 
14 Alain Enthoven, “Curing Fragmentation With Integrated Delivery Systems: What They Do, What Has Blocked Them, Why We Need Them, 
And How To Get There From Here,” in Einer Elhauge, ed. The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care: Causes and Solutions, Oxford Press 2010.
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models of per-capita prepayment.  Generally, they do 
not like managed competition because it would make 
them compete to provide value for money.  Exchanges 
in some states are seen as a platform for attacking Blue 
Cross Blue Shield virtual monopolies.  However, an 
important role for private insurance companies would 
remain in a managed competition system – but subject 
to fair rules and driven by value-conscious consumers.
Brokers inevitably see the growth of exchanges as 
a threat to their health insurance business relation-
ships.  Exchanges would be wise to find a way to work 
with them provided the costs are not too high. Some 
brokers have formed private-sector exchanges for 
Medicare.
As for the Congress itself, fee-for-service Medicare 
gives some members of Congress a large supply of 
potential particularized benefits to use to reward 
supporters and contributors.  Turning Medicare over 
to market forces driven by fair rules and informed 
consumer choice will be a loss of power for them.  
However, as Medicare spending growth forces more 
and more cutbacks to programs Members hold dear, 
Congressional attitudes are likely to change.  When 
cutting expenses is the rule, being the bearer of bad 
news in the form of payment reductions is a less 
appealing role than the previous role of giving out more 
money.
Versions of managed competition for Medicare reform 
have been proposed by, among others, the Bipartisan 
Commission on the Future of Medicare (“Breaux-
Thomas”) in 1999, and more recently by the Bipartisan 
Policy Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force chaired 
by former Senator Pete Domenici and former Budget 
Director Alice Rivlin, and by Congressman Paul 
Ryan, Chairman of the House Budget Committee.  
Other policymakers who have supported similar ideas 
include Senator Ron Wyden, a member of the Finance 
Committee, and Congressman Jim Cooper, a leader 
of the Blue Dog Democrats, and their bi-partisan 
co-sponsors in their proposals.  The idea appeals to 
centrists seeking bipartisan agreement.  However, 
it does not appeal to the traditional interest groups, 
and will not until they look hard at the inevitable and 
clearly less attractive alternatives.
The rip tides of current politics, driven by tactical 
positioning, have produced an ironic situation in 
which Democrats favor managed competition in the 
context of the ACA, where exchanges play a key role 
for subsidized people without employer coverage, while 
opposing it for Medicare; while Republicans, following 
the leadership of Paul Ryan, favor managed competi-
tion in Medicare and voted for it in their Fiscal 2012 
budget resolution, but oppose the ACA’s inclusion of 
exchanges.  In fact, some Republican governors are 
rejecting exchanges for their states, a baffling stance for 
people who usually profess a belief in free markets.
What Would Happen If Managed Competition 
Were Adopted For Medicare?  
There has been relatively extensive research about a 
managed-competition regime for the general popula-
tion.  However, there may need to be more thought on 
the current, post-ACA environment and how it affects 
choices moving forward with Medicare.
First, a sensible strategy ought to build on the 25 
percent of Medicare beneficiaries who have chosen 
Medicare Advantage plans in which they can get 
coordinated comprehensive care from familiar provid-
ers.  Insurers have argued for Medicare Advantage 
payments from government higher than the cost 
of FFS Medicare, which has the advantages of 
government-administered price and lower administra-
tive costs.  This argument may apply to private health 
insurance plans that are basically FFS, but would not 
apply to IDS-based health plans that can lower costs 
below those of FFS by their superior care management 
efficiency.
Next, many hospitals and their medical staffs would 
see in managed competition both a threat and an 
opportunity – an opportunity to keep their patients 
and attract more by organizing a higher-value delivery 
system and marketing it on the Medicare exchange, 
but a threat that they would lose out to other providers 
if they did not offer a competitive service.  The ACOs 
that would be formed in response to the opportunity 
would contract with insurance companies to provide 
marketing advice, actuarial services, information 
systems, capital to finance expansion, and reinsurance 
or other forms of risk sharing.  The ACOs’ motivation 
to form competitive IDS would be much stronger than 
it is under existing laws and regulations, because they 
would need to do so to avoid losing their patients to 
more efficient providers.  ACOs would want to have 
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their own insurance plans to market their superior 
value for money.  The penalty for lack of performance 
on cost and quality would be loss of patients and their 
premium revenues.
Having done this, the ACOs could then go to work on 
reducing the estimated 30 to 40 percent of spending 
that is waste.  There are precedents and examples in 
existing IDS that the ACOs could use, such as this list 
of ways to cut cost while improving quality published 
in a Perspective in the New England Journal of Medicine:
•	 Implement best practices for prevention of 
infections.
•	 Strengthen primary care for prevention, early 
detection and treatment of disease.
•	 Align incentives of providers with needs of mem-
bers for high-quality, affordable care.
•	 Active management of chronic diseases to reduce 
need for hospital care.
•	 Share comprehensive medical records to improve 
physicians’ knowledge of patients’ history and 
eliminate duplication of tests.
•	 Track patient outcomes and feed results back into 
decisions.
•	 Implement effective evaluation, selection, and 
purchasing of drugs and devices.
•	 Substitute less costly personnel where equally or 
more effective than MDs.
•	 Continuously improve quality and redesign 
processes.
•	 Rely on evidence based guidelines to eliminate 
unwanted variation and accelerate application of 
the latest science.
•	 Use information technology for caregiver support 
tools such as reminders, alerts, and secure messag-
ing between doctors and patients.15
In some areas now dominated by FFS solo prac-
tice, doctors might form Independent Practice 
Associations, acquire information technology, and 
work on their own insurance plans or collaborate with 
existing insurance companies.  In other words, not all 
ACO providers need to share the same four walls.
Next, existing large Multi Specialty Group Practices 
(MSGP) that do not have their own insurance plan 
would create one or contract with an insurance compa-
ny to partner with them.  When most of their revenues 
come in the form of premiums, their situation approxi-
mates per capita prepayment.  Owning or controlling 
their own health plans would enable them to align 
incentives more completely, so that a dollar saved in the 
delivery system could be translated into a dollar saved 
by the consumers they are seeking to attract.
The many prominent large MSGPs that already have 
their own insurance plans – e.g., the Dean Clinic in 
Wisconsin, Intermountain Healthcare in Utah, Scott 
and White Health Plan in Texas, the Marshfield 
Clinic in Wisconsin – would offer their plans through 
the Medicare Exchange.  In many cases, they already 
offer Medicare Advantage plans.  These organized 
systems would have a large head start in the race for 
patients, based on their years of developing and im-
proving performance.  This would enable them to grow 
their membership.  They therefore would need more 
doctors, who could be recruited from the traditional 
sector that would be losing members. Other healthcare 
systems like Ault Care in Ohio or Advocate in Illinois 
could team up with insurance companies to offer their 
services on the Medicare exchange.
The successful nonprofit prepaid group practices like 
Kaiser Permanente, Group Health Cooperative of 
Puget Sound, and the Group Health Cooperatives 
in Wisconsin, which already serve many Medicare 
members, would have larger markets in which to 
compete and would be able to offer their efficiency to 
members in the form of reduced premiums.  Per capita 
prepayment eliminates the cost of billing and collecting 
for individual items of care.
Many of these organizations could expand geographi-
cally (as some have) by creating primary care outposts, 
staffed by primary care physicians supported by Nurse 
Practitioners or Physician Assistants, plus other 
allied health professionals such as physiotherapists, 
all linked to the main medical centers by electronic 
information systems that would enable them to share 
15 Alain Enthoven, “Reforming Medicare by Reforming Incentives,” op. cit.
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up to date records.  Patients would be able to have their 
blood tests and x-rays sent electronically to specialists 
at the medical center.  Radiologists could read the 
x-rays and report back. Telemedicine could provide 
patients with accessible specialist consultations.  This 
is already happening and working.  For health plans to 
be able to serve people in thinly populated areas, some 
changes in regulation, such as existing requirements 
that an HMO cannot cover a service area unless it has 
a hospital within convenient distance of members plus 
a full complement of specialists, would be needed.  If 
we want rural areas to have access to IDS, and through 
them high-quality cost-efficient health care, it will be 
necessary for governments to permit substitution of 
telemedicine for the physical presence of specialists, 
and to allow short-stay holding beds and transporta-
tion to substitute for full hospitals.  There are now 
several famous rural integrated delivery systems, 
including the Marshfield Clinic in Wisconsin, Scott 
and White in Temple, Texas, and Intermountain 
Healthcare in Utah, which is both urban in Salt 
Lake City and also in rural areas.  So it would not be 
accurate to suggest that integrated systems cannot 
work in rural areas.  Electronic technology promises to 
facilitate this development.
The probable outcome of opening the market to 
efficient delivery systems, and allowing them to pass 
on their economies in the form of savings to enrolled 
members, would be the transformation of America’s 
healthcare system into a multiplicity of organized 
integrated delivery systems, competing to offer greater 
value to their enrolled members.
Traditional wide-access FFS would continue to exist 
because some people prefer it and are willing to pay the 
extra cost for extra freedom, and also because it might 
serve people in areas not yet served by competing 
systems.
For example, the Health Benefits Division of the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS) brokers insurance for some 1.3 million 
people, a large exchange for public employees in 
California.  They found that some people lived in areas 
not yet served by IDS, and some others preferred 
wide-access fee-for-service health care, perhaps because 
of strong attachments to their doctors.  So CalPERS 
hired a private insurance carrier to participate in their 
system, offer wide-access FFS insurance, and pay 
providers negotiated rates.  (These plans are self-
insured by the state but they operate on a breakeven 
non-subsidized basis.)
Must Traditional FFS Medicare Continue 
As An Option? 
Some kind of wide access FFS coverage will be needed 
to serve people who do not live in areas served by 
ACOs and people who have a strong preference for 
that type of coverage and are willing to pay for it. 
CalPERS has shown one way to do that.
Some have proposed that in the transition to managed 
competition in Medicare, traditional FFS Medicare 
should be retained as an option.  Traditional FFS 
Medicare has many problems, as is being increasingly 
acknowledged.  They include rigidity.  It is very hard 
to change a program that is managed in detail by the 
Congress, and needs political consensus and an Act 
of Congress to change.  For example, it has been well 
known for years that Congress overpays specialist 
physicians relative to generalists, so that now we often 
have too many specialists and too few generalists.  
Attempts to correct this are blocked by the fact that 
the specialists can recycle some of those overpayments 
into political contributions to block needed change.
If the traditional FFS option has to play by the same 
rules as the other competitors (i.e. consumers who 
choose it must pay the full excess costs associated with 
it; it must pay negotiated market prices and not admin-
istered prices that allow it to shift costs to the private 
sector; and it must not be subsidized to preserve its 
market viability and become a “Fannie-Med,” i.e. a  
competitor unfairly advantaged, and a sink hole for 
taxpayers), then the goals sought by preserving such an 
option ought to be achievable.
Controlling The Growth In Government 
Medicare Outlays
The government’s contributions to individual Medicare 
beneficiaries’ purchases can be managed in a variety of 
ways.
The National Bipartisan Commission on the Future 
of Medicare (the “Breaux-Thomas” Commission of 
1998-1999) proposed that the government would 
pay 88 percent of the weighted-average premium for 
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the standard benefits package, and the beneficiaries 
would pay the rest.  This is a “beneficiary friendly” 
approach in which personal contributions would grow 
in proportion to the increase in overall costs, but not 
more.  Deficit reduction would depend on the effective-
ness of competition in “bending the cost curve,” which 
in turn would depend a great deal on reform of the 
non-Medicare market (see below).
In the Wisconsin State employee, University of 
California and Stanford groups, the employer 
contribution is set (approximately) at the price of the 
low-priced plan in each service area.  This maximizes 
the incentive for the employee to migrate to less-costly 
plans, but cannot be expected to “bend the curve” 
unless most other employers in the area also practice 
managed competition.  If most employers remain with 
open-ended FFS, the providers will serve that large 
market of cost-unconscious FFS patients, and simply 
ignore the competitive sub-sector.
There is sound reason to believe that competition 
among healthcare plans serving empowered cost-
conscious consumers would “bend the curve” and slow 
the growth of the federal government’s cost.  However, 
the workings of the free market are always unpredict-
able, and in the context of essential and urgent budget 
deficit reduction there is a need to achieve more-
predictable, “scorable” budget savings.  Two current 
approaches to healthcare reform would achieve those 
scorable savings in different ways.
The Bipartisan Policy Center Debt Reduction Task 
Force (the “Domenici-Rivlin” proposal)
will transition Medicare to a premium support 
program, and will control the growth of the 
total cost of the program.  Starting in 2018, 
federal support per Medicare enrollee will be 
limited to the 2017 level and will be allowed to 
grow no faster than a five-year moving average 
of GDP growth plus one percentage point.…
Like today, Medicare enrollees will be in the 
traditional fee-for-service program unless they 
choose a private plan.  However, if federal 
spending per enrollee for the benefits specified 
in legislation rises faster than GDP growth 
plus one percent, beneficiaries will have to pay 
an additional premium to cover the difference.  
They can avoid that additional premium, 
however, and potentially get higher quality 
health care, if they choose a private health plan 
offered on a new Medicare Exchange.  The ex-
pectation is that increased competition among 
plans fostered by the Medicare Exchange, and 
increased beneficiary interest in these plans, 
will keep costs from rising rapidly and result in 
higher quality, more cost-effective health care.16
Thus, Domenici-Rivlin proposes limiting the growth 
in federal support per beneficiary to one percentage 
point per year higher than a five-year moving average 
of GDP growth.  Because the number of beneficiaries 
will grow at 3 percent per year instead of 2 percent per 
year, this precise formula (which could be changed) 
will allow an increase in Medicare’s share of the GDP.17 
But there is reason to hope that the healthcare system, 
in response to competition, will limit cost growth even 
more, and that the statutory restraint on the increase 
in premiums will not bind.
Congressman Ryan’s proposal is more aggressive.  
It would index the premium support payments to 
the overall Consumer Price Index (CPI) for urban 
consumers, which would be less than GDP growth.18  
Also, in the Ryan proposal, premium support pay-
ments would be means tested, so that, for example, 
people in the top 2 per cent of the Medicare income 
distribution would receive just 30 per cent of the full 
premium support payments.  People in the lower 92 
percent of the income distribution would receive the 
full payment.  Indexing to the CPI would send a stron-
ger signal to the health services industry that health 
care funds would be limited.  But some have argued 
that it would shift too high a burden to beneficiaries.
16 The Debt-Reduction Task Force, Senator Pete Domenici and Dr. Alice Rivlin, Co-Chairs, Restoring America’s Future: Reviving the Economy, 
Cutting Spending and Debt, and Creating a Simple, Pro-Growth Tax System, Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, November 10, 2010. 
17 From 1980 to 2005, Medicare spending per member grew 7.5 percent per year, GDP grew 6.2 percent per year.  The number of Medicare 
beneficiaries will grow 3 percent per year.  So Domenici-Rivlin would allow Medicare spending to grow 6.2 percent + 3 percent + 1 percent, or 10.2 
percent, consuming a rising share of GDP. 
18 From 1980 to 2005, GDP grew 6.2 percent per year, and the CPI-U grew 3.5 percent.
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Quoting from the CBO summary of the Ryan 
proposal
Among other changes, the proposal would 
convert the current Medicare program to a 
system under which beneficiaries received 
premium support payments – payments that 
would be used to help pay the premiums for a 
private health insurance policy and would grow 
over time with overall consumer prices.  The 
change would apply to people turning 65 begin-
ning in 2022; beneficiaries who turn 65 before 
then would remain in the traditional Medicare 
program with the option of converting to the 
new system.19
Thus, although the Ryan plan aims to eliminate the 
current Medicare FFS program, it would grandfather 
all beneficiaries or prospective beneficiaries age 55 and 
over.  They could stay in traditional FFS Medicare.  
Potentially, this could keep a “long tail” of declining 
numbers of FFS beneficiaries for 45 years or more, 
and the need to continue to operate this program.  To 
mitigate this prospect, the Ryan proposal would need 
to be modified to increase incentives to switch to a 
competing comprehensive care plan along the lines of 
the Domenici-Rivlin proposal.
The likely alternative will be for the Congress to 
adjust the increase in the premium support payments 
annually, depending on conditions at the time, in a 
manner similar to the way it adjusts hospital prospec-
tive payments now.  This model would make Medicare 
outlays controllable expenses instead of uncontrollable 
expenses on auto pilot as is the case now.
In all of the current proposals, the indexing does not 
begin until around 2018-2021, so there is plenty of 
time for Congress to reconsider what it plans to do.  
It would be a mistake for partisans on either side to 
declare political war now over amounts that can and 
quite likely will be adjusted annually by Congress seven 
to ten years from now.  The important thing today is 
to get the managed competition framework into place 
and allow market forces to attack the 30 percent to 40 
percent waste in the system.
What Is The Alternative To Managed Competition?
Although the case for the managed competition model 
in Medicare would seem persuasive, the ACA went in a 
different direction.
First, the ACA proposes ACOs, but in the context of 
FFS Medicare. These are voluntary arrangements in 
which many groups are likely to choose not to partici-
pate (contrary to what would happen in a managed 
competition framework.)  ACOs accept responsibility 
for the cost and quality of care for populations ascribed 
to them based on past use patterns, except that in the 
ACA concept, ACOs would not know who their pa-
tients are.  Unlike an HMO or a Medicare Advantage 
plan, in this case the beneficiaries do not choose to 
commit to one ACO for all their care.  They are free 
to go elsewhere for care whenever they want.  In fact, 
they may not even know they are doing so.  So the 
ACO providers complain that they do not know the 
names of the people whose health they are supposed to 
safeguard, and for whom they can be held responsible.  
The assignment of members to ACOs is retrospec-
tive.  An ACO may get a bad score because some of its 
ascribed patients went out of the ACO for some very 
expensive and possibly unnecessary care.
Why didn’t the Congress design the program in such 
a way that patients could be enticed to choose to enroll 
by being allowed to keep the savings if they did join?  
As noted above, apparently Congress misread the 
experience of the 1990s and thought that people would 
not elect to join an ACO because they did not want 
to limit their choices of provider, despite the fact that 
about 25 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have chosen 
Medicare Advantage programs already.  (And in 
Medicare Advantage, enrollees can get better benefits, 
but not money back.)  Alternatively, perhaps, under 
the influence of an overwhelming lobbying campaign, 
Congress simply chose to stop short of an effective 
program.
Compared to remaining with open-ended FFS, the 
incentives for providers to form ACOs are weak, 
possibly non-existent.  The shared savings models say 
to providers, “If you will reduce your revenues from 
19 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, to the Honorable Paul Ryan, Chairman Committed on the 
Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington D.C. 20515 , April 5, 2011
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Medicare by $1 million, Medicare will give you back 
$500,000.”  Some providers are likely to think, “Why 
don’t we just stay out of the ACO, and keep the whole 
million?”  And added to this, there will be substantial, 
if worthwhile, costs in organizational development and 
information technology just to get into the game.  It 
was not surprising when the American Medical Group 
Association (AMGA), the association of doctors most 
likely to form and develop ACOs, reported that 93 
percent of their members would not participate, at 
least in the models described in the first regulations.  
CMS is now designing what may be more attractive 
models.  But the fundamental flaws remain.
Second, within the ACA framework, Congress may 
expect to rely on cutting provider payments.  For 
example, the ACA did not repeal the Sustainable 
Growth Rate (SGR) formula, leaving in place large 
scheduled cuts in the amounts Medicare pays doctors.  
This permitted CBO to estimate $250 billion lower 
costs to the federal budget than would have been 
incurred if the SGR had been repealed.  For over 10 
years now, the Congress has relented at the last minute 
and postponed the cuts in doctor fees.  The postpone-
ments were doubtless encouraged by the fear that doc-
tors would respond by refusing to add new Medicare 
patients to their practices, a pressure that Congress has 
been unable to resist for over a decade.
Beyond that problem, history has shown that doctors 
have been able to offset to some extent the revenue 
losses from Medicare fee cuts by increasing the volume 
and intensity of services.  Some of that is likely to be 
more surgery of doubtful necessity and other services 
that increase the demand for hospital services.  This is 
the source of much of the heroic but futile, or purely 
symbolic, services that we now refer to as “end-of-life 
care.”
The ACA did reduce the scheduled increases in 
hospital payments, potentially saving $500 billion over 
a decade.  It remains to be seen how well that will hold 
up when financially weak hospitals plead hardship.  On 
the other hand, many hospitals have market power and 
are able to shift the costs not reimbursed by Medicare 
to private-sector payers, thus driving up costs to the 
private sector.  Some of those costs will fall back on the 
government either through the tax exclusion of em-
ployer payments for employee health care, or through 
Federal subsidies to people buying coverage through 
the exchanges.
Finally, the ACA includes a board of 15 experts, the 
“Independent Payment Advisory Board”(IPAB), 
appointed by the President, serving full time on 
government pay with no outside financial connections 
or conflicts of interest.  The IPAB is charged to invent 
cost-cutting ideas, recommend them, and see them 
go into effect unless the Congress substitutes equally 
effective measures or overrides them with a super 
majority.  The IPAB will work under tight constraints 
– for example, it cannot touch hospital payments 
until 2020, and cannot touch covered benefits.  These 
central planners are most unlikely to do as good a job 
as hundreds of doctors and managers in local delivery 
systems working under the strong incentives of com-
petition to improve value for money for their enrolled 
members.  Most of the waste described in the National 
Academy of Sciences report is local in nature, as are 
the potential cures through process improvement – but 
the IPAB is unlikely to focus effectively on local issues.  
The IPAB is now under heavy fire in the Congress, 
by some Democrats as well as Republicans, and its 
survival is not assured.
What Else Must Be Done?
Reforming Medicare along managed competition lines 
would have a large impact.  While per-beneficiary 
spending on Medicare is at least twice that of employed 
people, still about three times as many people get their 
care through employer-sponsored insurance, and many 
of them are locked into open-ended FFS by their em-
ployers.  Thus, employment-based insurance provides 
a market full of cost-unconscious demand that will 
undermine Medicare reform.  Some strong action must 
be taken to reform the employment sector and make 
it a rich market for competitive IDS and ACOs.  For 
example, the exclusion of employer contributions from 
the taxable incomes of employees should be abolished 
and replaced by a refundable tax credit usable only 
for purchase of health insurance, independent of 
the employer, to stop the open-ended tax subsidy to 
more-costly health insurance.  This would also help 
balance the budget, and it might come about in the 
context of budget-balancing tax reform, to broaden the 
tax base and reduce marginal tax rates.  It would also 
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help if tax-excludable employer health plans had to use 
defined contributions.
Another measure that would be of great value would 
be to reform the ACA to broaden the choices available 
to employees by phasing in a requirement that all small 
employers (under 500 employees) buy health insurance 
through the exchanges, while continuing to contribute 
a substantial part of the costs themselves.  This would 
account for about half the labor force which, when 
combined with dependents, would greatly increase the 
market for cost-effective ACOs.  It would give millions 
of employees and their families the opportunity to save 
substantial amounts of money by choosing efficient 
providers, and it would give them more stable rates 
than today because many such small employers do not 
individually constitute viable risk pools.
A necessary policy change is to develop and enforce an 
effective anti-trust policy for health care.  Many large 
hospital systems have formed with the result, if not the 
intent, of greatly increasing market power.  Some of 
these must be rolled back, or else individual hospitals 
must be required to negotiate their own prices.  Even 
a much-more-efficient potential new entrant into a 
local market could be deterred if that market already is 
oversupplied with hospital beds (or some other crucial 
resource) by a monopoly that “earns” its profits by 
keeping those beds unproductively filled.
Responsible tort reform could help reduce expendi-
tures and is surely well worth doing on its own merits.  
A recent comprehensive study finds that “Overall 
annual medical liability system costs, including defen-
sive medicine, are estimated to be $55.6 billion in 2008 
dollars, or 2.4 percent of total health care spending.”20  
Tort reform may yield only a one-time change in the 
level of expenditures, with no long-term reduction in 
their growth rate.  Still, “safe harbors” for physicians 
based on best-practice guidelines and specialized 
healthcare courts could result in both better practice of 
medicine and quicker, less-costly delivery of compensa-
tion to those who are harmed by poor medical practice.
Conclusion
If public policy were to convert the American open-
ended fee-for-service healthcare system to one made 
up of mostly competing ACOs, each financed by 
risk-adjusted global per-capita prepayment, and mar-
keted mostly through exchanges, the financial savings 
could be very large, and quality and service could be 
improved.  Current waste-rewarding incentives would 
be transformed to encourage patients and providers 
to make wise choices in use of resources.  Of the 30 
percent to 40 percent waste described by the National 
Academies’ Report, waste reduction equal to 30 per-
cent of total spending might be a feasible target over a 
decade or two.  For example, about 10 percent could be 
saved by eliminating the costs of preparing and collect-
ing bills for items of service.  About another 20 percent 
might be saved by replacing insurance administrative 
costs for dealing with many individuals and small 
firms, by marketing standard contracts on exchanges 
for tens of thousands of people. And Medicare Parts 
A,B,D and “Medigap” would be replaced by single 
standard comprehensive care contracts.
Such a model would encourage development of cost-
reducing technologies.  Such competition-driven cost-
reducing innovation would help to offset expenditure-
increasing effects of new costly technologies.
The future of reformed health care is uncertain, given 
all the complex interacting factors.  But these funda-
mental changes in organization and incentives could, 
over a decade or two, yield health care expenditures 
half of what they otherwise would be if we stayed 
with the failed model we have today – with improved 
quality of care at the same time.
20 Mello, M.M., Chandra, A., Gawande, A.A. and Studdert, D.M. “National Costs of the Medical Liability System,” Health Affairs 29 no.9 (2010) 
1569-1577.
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